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Abstract
In a simplified setting, we show how to price invoice non-recourse factoring taking into ac-
count not only the credit worthiness of the debtor but also the assignor’s one, together with
the default correlation between the two. Indeed, the possible default of the assignor might
impact the payoff by means of the bankruptcy revocatory, especially in case of undisclosed
factoring.
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1 Standard Pricing Model
Conventional practices in non-recourse factoring (see Figure 1) rely on the debtor’s creditwor-
thiness as a major determinant for pricing, or often consider it as the unique relevant parameter
in the derivation of the expected payoff of an operation. In most cases, indeed, the default of
the invoice debtor is assumed as the unique event with an actual impact on factoring proceed-
ings. As a consequence, the standard pricing approach typically neglects the occurrence of other
circumstances which might condition the outcome of an operation, thus limiting the number of
features considered in the computation of its fair value.
According to this view, the problem of pricing in invoice factoring can be simply represented
by defining a set of complementary probabilistic events, which are centered on the conditions
deemed as crucial for the realization of the payoff. In the case of standard non-recourse factoring,
therefore, such event corresponds to:
1τ<T =
{
1, if τ < T
0, if τ > T
(1)
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of a standard invoice factoring operation.
1) Issuance of the receivable to the debtor and creation of the credit claim with maturity T .
2) Assignment of the receivable to the factor upon payment of the purchase price C(1− α) and
transfer of the enforcement power for the credit reimbursement to the assignee.
where τ is the time to default of the debtor, and T the expected time of repayment of the
receivable (i.e. the operation’s maturity). When the default event occurs, i.e. 1τ<T = 1,
the debtor defaults before repaying its debt, reducing the reimbursement obtainable by the
assignee to a recovery value rC (with r indicating a recovery rate) typically smaller than the
actual receivable value C. In the opposite case, the default of the debtor will occur after the
credit maturity, allowing the assignee to fully receive the repayment of its credit. It follows, by
definition, that the probability of the first event occurring is the default probability PDT of the
debtor by time T , while the second event defines the probability of the debtor to survive until
the conclusion of the factoring operation.
In symbols:
E (1τ<T ) = P(τ < T ) = PDT . (2)
As we know different outcomes associated to each of the two events discussed, we can also define
the overall payoff of the operation from the assignee’s perspective as:
Payoff = rC · 1τ<T + C · (1− 1τ<T ) , (3)
and its price - calculated as the expected payoff, not discounted for sake of simplicity - as
Price = rC · E (1τ<T ) + C · (1− E (1τ<T ))
= rC · P(τ < T ) + C · (1− P(τ < T )) = C (1− (1− r)PDT ) , (4)
which depends exclusively on the default probability of the debtor, the recovery value in case of
its default and the value of the outstanding invoice. The quantity (1− r)PDT must be smaller
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than the discount on the invoice purchase price α, in order for the bank to make a profit, as
depicted in the second part of Figure 1.
2 The role of the assignor’s default
We now examine how the assignor’s default enters into the standard pricing framework presented
in section 1, with the purpose to better understand its role compared to the one played by the
debtor’s default.
The pricing problem for non recourse factoring should be adapted, in this case, to include a
new set of events possibly affecting the outcome of an operation, each one depending on both
the behaviour of the assignor and the debtor. According to the notation used so far, this new
set is given by:
Events : Payoffs :
(a) 1τA<τB<T rBC
(b) 1τB<τA<T rBC
(c) 1τB<T<τA rBC
(d) 1T<τA<τB C
(e) 1T<τB<τA C
(f) 1τA<T<τB C
where A stays for the assignor, B for the debtor, and τA, τB for their respective times to default.
The first event in the list, for instance, corresponds to the case where both A, the assignor,
and B, the debtor, default before the assignee manages to receive the payment of the purchased
receivable at time T , with the assignor defaulting before its debtor. In this case the assignee
will be able only to benefit from the recovery value associated to its credit towards the debtor,
rBC. Similarly, in the last event reported, the assignor A will default before the maturity of
the repayment, while the debtor B will default only after having paid off its debt towards the
assignee. This, of course, leads to a payoff for the assignee given by the full credit value, C.
The probability of each of the events described above, therefore, can always be interpreted as
the probability of two separate, elementary events occurring jointly. Taking event (a) as an
example, we can then recall the definition of joint probability as follows:
E (1τA<τB<T ) = P {(τA, τB < T ) ∩ (τA < τB)}
= P (τA, τB < T |τA < τB) · P(τA < τB). (5)
By visually inspecting the list of the events above, it is easy to note that all the potential
payoffs available to the assignee only depend on the time to default of the ceded debtor τB,
while no impact is actually due to to the potential default of the assignor. This means that
the creditworthiness of the latter will not affect the pricing formula for factoring, which will
predictably results to be equal to equation (4). In fact, the expected payoff for the assignee can
be synthesized using only two probabilistic events related to τB, coming from the sum of events
(a), (b), (c), and (d), (e), (f) respectively. This leads to:
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Price = rBC · E (1τB<T ) + C · (1− E (1τB<T )) (6)
which, in probabilistic terms, is again equivalent to:
Price = rBC · P(τB < T ) + C · (1− P(τB < T )) . (7)
It’ s worth noting that this result holds for any value the default correlation between the two
parties A and B might take, and regardless of any specific assumption about the shape of the
marginal and joint probability distributions of τA and τB. The result in (7), however, should
not lead to the conclusion that the creditworthiness of the assignor is always a negligible factor
in factoring pricing. In the following section, we will indeed present a more refined approach
where such variable comes into play, with a significant impact on the price determination.
3 Pricing under bankruptcy revocatory
As it is the case for other financial transactions, even invoice factoring is generally exposed to
the risk of the assignor’s bankruptcy by means of the application of the so called claw-back
actions (or bankruptcy revocatory). Such procedures find their legal discipline within different
frameworks of the Italian law. The Italian Bankruptcy Law2, in the first place, provides that once
the insolvency of a debtor has been declared all transactions effected by him over the previous
year (or, in certain cases, over the previous six months) are scrutinized and possibly unwound
as preferential. The major consequence is that the creditors’ claims arisen in this period are
set aside until the completion of the bankruptcy procedure and the distribution of the debtor’ s
assets among its creditors. A competitor legal framework to this one, which specifically applies
to the case of factoring, is the Italian Factoring Law (Law of 21 February 1991, n. 52). This
law establishes the unenforceability to third parties of the sale of a trade receivable in case
the finalization of the sale contract was made within a suspect period of one year prior to the
bankruptcy of the seller3. Despite relying on different assumption, rationales, and requirements,
both these two legal regimes determine, where applicable, a unique outcome - the waiver of the
factor’s creditory claim towards the seller and the debtor - which can lead to a temporary or
permanent loss for the assignee in a factoring operation. This is all the more true in the case
of “confidential” factoring, where the assignment of the receivable has not been notified to the
debtor, thus making the enforcement of the assignee’ s claim even more difficult.
All this suggests that the bankruptcy revocatory of the assignor might enter into the pricing
procedure for factoring as a relevant event, adding to the debtor’s default we discussed in the
previous sections. In this regard, we can define a new set of potential events impacting the
payoff of factoring operations as follows:
2Art. 67, paragraphs I and II, specifies the type of transactions which are possibly subject to the application
of claw back actions, and the related applicable suspect period. Among other requirements, the article states that
the bankruptcy receiver also needs to prove that the other party was aware that the debtor was insolvent, upon
finalization of the transaction (“scientia decoctionis”).
3Art. 7 requires, similarly to the Bankruptcy Law, the existence of the “scientia decoctionis” for the enforce-
ment of the bankruptcy revocatory. This condition is typically verified in the case where the assignee of an invoice
is a bank, which can check if the debtors name is in the bulletin of unpaid negotiable instruments (e.g. notes,
drafts, checks), or collect information about its solvency.
4
Events : Payoffs :
(a) 1τB<τA<T · 1τA>∆ rBC
(b) 1τA<τB<T · 1τA>∆ rBC
(c) 1τB<T<τA · 1τA>∆ rBC
(d) 1τA<T<τB · 1τA>∆ C
(e) 1T<τB<τA · 1τA>∆ C
(f) 1T<τA<τB · 1τA>∆ C
(g) 1τB<τA<T · 1τA<∆ −αC + rAC(1− α)
(h) 1τA<τB<T · 1τA<∆ −αC + rAC(1− α)
(i) 1τB<T<τA · 1τA<∆ −αC + rAC(1− α)
(l) 1τA<T<τB · 1τA<∆ −αC + rAC(1− α)
(m) 1T<τB<τA · 1τA<∆ −αC + rAC(1− α)
(n) 1T<τA<τB · 1τA<∆ −αC + rAC(1− α)
where, on top of the notation used so far, we introduce the parameter ∆, i.e. the suspect period
for the enforcement of the bankruptcy revocatory in case of default of the assignor A. Note that,
at this stage, we can assume that ∆ features a suspect period of generic length, regardless of the
specific judicial procedure that might be proposed by the bankruptcy administrator (Bankruptcy
Law versus Factoring Law). Furthermore, besides the payoffs rBC and C, we have now a third
payoff, −αC + rAC(1−α), characterizing the events where the regime of the revocatory applies
- see for instance Figure 2 as a graphical representation of the case (m) or (n). 0 < α < 1, in the
first term of this payoff, represents the discount charged by the assignee on the nominal amount
of the invoice upon its purchase, as discussed above. This quantity αC should be put back to the
account seller in case of application of a clawback action. As mentioned, this always goes along
with the return of the credit claim towards the ceded debtor to the assignor, or, in case the claim
has already been cashed in, with the return of the proceeds collected by the assignee until the
default of the seller. The second term of the payoff reflects instead the positive recovery that the
factor may obtain from the redistribution of the bankruptcy proceedings of A. As the assignee
is entitled to lodge a claim equal to its original financial exposure to the defaulted assignor, this
term is expressed as rAC (1− α), where 0 < rA < 1 is the expected recovery percentage from
the liquidation procedure of A, and C(1− α) the original exposure.
It emerges, therefore, that the payoff foreseen in case of bankruptcy revocatory of the assignor
is a function of the assignee’s purchase price itself:
Price = C (1− α) . (8)
We can sum up all the events associated to a certain payoff, in order to get a simpler view
of the actual events in scope. By following the same passages as in section 2, the assignee’s
expected payoff boils down to:
Price = rBC ·E (1τB<T · 1τA>∆)+C ·E (1τB>T · 1τA>∆)+(−αC+rAC (1− α)) ·E (1τA<∆) (9)
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Figure 2: Application of the assignor’s bankruptcy revocatory after full repayment of the invoice
amount, and subsequent implications on the assignee’s outflows, as per events (m) or (n) above.
1) Payment by the debtor of the due receivable amount C at the envisaged maturity T .
2) Default of the assignor in τA > T and return of the factoring proceedings C collected by
the assignee to the invoice seller, together with the fee gained on the credit, αC. During the
redistribution of the bankruptcy proceedings of the assignor, the assignee recovers a fraction of
its financial exposure to the assignee, rAC (1− α).
which, in terms of the corresponding probabilities and of the relation in (8), returns4 :
Price = rBC · P (τB < T, τA > ∆) + C · P (τB > T, τA > ∆) + (rAC(1− α)− αC) · P (τA < ∆)
=
rBC · P (τB < T, τA > ∆) + C · P (τB > T, τA > ∆)− C · P (τA < ∆)
1− (1 + rA) · P (τA < ∆) . (10)
Equation (10) shows therefore, how factoring operations could be priced when executed in
a framework which envisions the application of revocatory actions in case of bankruptcy of the
seller. The introduction of such regime makes the factor’s payoff sensitive to the probability
of default of its assignor, as it also appears by comparing equations (10) and (7). This implies
that, ceteris paribus, the lower the creditworthiness of the assignor, the higher its probability
of defaulting within the bankruptcy suspect period, and thus the higher the probability of the
assignee to incur a financial loss due to the revocatory procedure. As a consequence, the expected
payoff of the factor tends do decrease as the the default probability of the assignor increases.
This effect is only mitigated by the possibility for the assignee to recover a fraction rA of its
financial exposure in case of default of the seller, as also indicated by the denominator of (10).
Vice versa, the higher the probability of the assignor not to default within such period, the
higher the probability of the assignee to receive a higher positive payoff (the debtor’s recovery
rate rBC or the full credit amount C), jointly depending on the default probability of the debtor.
This suggests that the correlation between the time to default of the assignor and the debtor
plays now a considerable role in the definition of the price. As it will be better illustrated in the
next section, a larger correlation acts by shifting the expected payoff towards the full recovery
of the receivable amount.
4For more details, see the appendix at section A.1
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4 Application
In this section we will apply the pricing formula (10) to show how it works in a simple case, where
we define a specific distribution for the random variables τA, τB. We assume, therefore, that the
default times have a bivariate exponential distribution obtained combining exponential marginal
distributions with constant default intensity5 with a Gumbel copula, disallowing simultaneous
defaults. This particular choice of copula is common in the recent literature, and has the
advantage of being analytically tractable. The resulting joint survival probability reads:
P (τA > tA, τB > tB) = e−[(λAtA)
θ+(λBtB)
θ]
1
θ (11)
with θ ∈ [1,∞), while the constant default intensity λx gives an exponential form to the marginal
survival probability P (τx > t) = e
−λxt. Observe that Kendalls Tau (a non-parametric measure
of dependence between two random variables) τK = 1 − 1θ , so that the independent case
corresponds to θ = 1, and the comonotonic (fully dependent) case to θ =∞. From eq.(11), the
joint cumulative probability function of the default times is:
FA,B(tA, tB) = P (τA < tA, τB < tB) = e−[(λAtA)
θ+(λBtB)
θ]
1
θ − e−λAtA + 1− e−λBtB (12)
and the joint probability density function is:
fA,B(τA, τB) =
[
θ − 1 +
(
λθAτ
θ
A + λ
θ
Bτ
θ
B
) 1
θ
](
λθAτ
θ
A + λ
θ
Bτ
θ
B
)( 1θ−2) ·
λθAλ
θ
Bτ
θ−1
A τ
θ−1
B e
−[(λAτA)θ+(λBτB)θ]
1
θ . (13)
Having set this out, we can simply convert the probabilities featuring the pricing equation
(10) in terms of the specified joint distribution as:
P (τB < T, τA > ∆) =
∫ ∞
∆
dτA
∫ T
0
fA,B(τA, τB)dτB (14)
P (τB > T, τA > ∆) =
∫ ∞
∆
dτA
∫ ∞
T
fA,B(τA, τB)dτB (15)
P (τA < ∆) =
∫ ∞
0
dτB
∫ ∆
0
fA,B(τA, τB)dτA (16)
Thus, the overall is results equal to6:
Price =
rBC
(
−e−[(λA∆)θ+(λBT )θ]
1
θ + e−λA∆
)
+ C
(
e−[(λA∆)
θ+(λBT )
θ]
1
θ
)
− C (1− e−λA∆)
e−λA∆ − rA (1− e−λA∆)
= C
(1− rB) e−[(λA∆)θ+(λBT )θ]
1
θ − 1 + e−λA∆ (1 + rB)
e−λA∆ (1 + rA)− rA . (17)
This formulation provides a better insight on how the correlation parameter θ enters into
the definition of the price. An increase of the default correlation will cause a reduction of the
probability of the factor to get the recovery payoff rBC, i.e. the probability that debtor defaults
5The constant default intensity λx gives an exponential form to the survivalship probability P (τx > t) = e
−λxt
6For more details, see the appendix at section A.2.
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before the repayment period while no revocatory action is enforceable towards the assignee
(eq. (14)). On the other hand, a higher default correlation also implies a higher probability
that both the debtor and the assignor will jointly survive until the maturity of the operation,
allowing the assignee to receive the full reimbursement of its credit (eq. (15)). This second effect
always prevails on the first one, thus making the expected payoff of the assignee an increasing
function of θ. Furthermore, as stated before, the payoff will discount a higher reduction as the
probability of default of the assignor increases (eq. (16)), other things being unchanged7.
Below, we show these results assuming a suspect period of half the length of the factoring
maturity (∆ = 0.5 and T = 1), and an invoice nominal amount C = 100. For simplicity, we
assume that the recovery rates from the default of A and B are both equal to 20%, so that
rA = rB = 20%. The expected payoff of the assignee is first computed according to the conven-
tional pricing formula in (7), i.e. considering only the debtor’s default probability. We assume
that the debtor’s default intensity is λB = 0.1, which corresponds to a PDB = 9.5% - in line
with a single B rating - and a credit spread of 7.6% on an ordinary loan. The pricing equation
(17) is then applied for comparison purposes, firstly taking the default intensity of the assignor
as λA = 0.1, and secondly as λA = 0.2, corresponding to a credit spread twice as large as the
first one.
θ τK
Prices
λB=0.1 λB=0.1, λA=0.1 λB=0.1, λA=0.2
1 0.00 92.387 88.164 83.629
2 0.50 92.387 91.011 88.089
3 0.67 92.387 91.606 89.309
4 0.75 92.387 91.796 89.873
5 0.80 92.387 91.866 90.199
Table 1: Application of pricing formulas (7) and (17) for different values of θ, and default
intensities λA, λB; ∆ = 0.5 and T = 1.
In the next table we show the results when the time to repayment of the loan T = 0.5 is
shorter than the suspect period ∆ = 1. In this case, the default probability of the debtor is
obviously about half that of the previous example, and both the first to default effect and the
correlation effect are even more pronounced. This is quite a significant result, as one might
think that even if the assignor is quite risky, the transaction profitability depends only on the
credit quality of the debtor, while one can see that the main contribution comes from the default
probability of the assignor.
7These results are obviously influenced by the specific choice of copula we used in this example, which implies
a symmetric correlation between τA and τB . Alternative copula models, as those implying a skewed correlation
between the times to default, could be a valid substitute approach to the one discussed, and lead to different
results, for example by increasing the correlation between default, without modifying that between survival.
8
θ τK
Prices
λB=0.1 λB=0.1, λA=0.1 λB=0.1, λA=0.2
1 0.00 96.09835 87.42007 77.38472
2 0.50 96.09835 90.44666 80.95348
3 0.67 96.09835 91.07899 81.38043
4 0.75 96.09835 91.28085 81.45081
5 0.80 96.09835 91.35512 81.46387
Table 2: Application of pricing formulas (7) and (17) for different values of θ, and default
intensities λA, λB; ∆ = 1 and T = 0.5.
5 Conclusions
Assessing the creditworthiness of a debtor is a key element for non-recourse invoice factoring, as
it affects the evaluation by factoring facilities of the actual profitability of such operations. As
a matter of fact, the standard pricing techniques in this field often focus on the debtor’s default
as the only relevant event for price determination, while neglecting the potential role played by
the default of the receivable assignor, or its correlation with the debtor’s one. These events, in
fact, turn out to be relevant whenever they exert a direct binding effect on the payoff of the
factor, as it happens, for instance, by means of the application of the bankruptcy revocatory
procedure. Under this regime, the factor credit claim towards the debtor, or the proceedings
already collected from the latter, are put back to the receivable seller in case of declaration of its
bankrupt, provided that the receivable sale contract was finalized in a period of time (usually six
months to one year) prior to the declaration of default. This determines, especially in the case of
non notification factoring, the inability of the assignee to enforce its position towards the ceded
debtor. Furthermore, it implies the obligation for the assignor to return the invoice discount
originally retained upon purchase and thus a potential financial loss at the end of the revocatory
procedure. The larger the assignor’ s probability of default, therefore, the higher the probability
for the assignee to fall into such revocatory framework, which translates, eventually, into a lower
expected payoff. In addition to this, the assignee’s return does also depend on the joint riskiness
of the assignor and the debtor, as the relative timing of their default events can substantially
influence the payoff of the operation. In particular, the higher the default correlation between
the two, the higher, ceteris paribus, their probability to jointly survive until the time due for the
repayment of the receivable, allowing the assignee to receive the value of the outstanding invoice.
These considerations feature therefore a different pricing approach than the conventional one,
as it admits, under bankruptcy revocatory, the inclusion of the creditworthiness of the assignor
and its correlation with the debtor’s default as additional determinants of factoring prices.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of equation (10)
We briefly derive in this section the pricing equation (10), by substituting the relation in (9)
into the assignee’ s expected payoff:
Price = rBC ·P (τB < T, τA > ∆) +C ·P (τB > T, τA > ∆) + (−αC + rAC(1− α)) ·P (τA < ∆) .
As both the discount αC and the financial exposure of the assignee C(1 − α) are clearly a
function of the purchase price of the invoice, it is necessary to make the latter explicit into the
above equation. Hence, replacing equation (9) into the previous one, we obtain:
Price = rBC ·P (τB < T, τA > ∆) +C ·P (τB > T, τA > ∆) + (Price− C + rAPrice) ·P (τA < ∆)
which, factoring out the price variable, returns:
Price (1− (1 + rA) · P (τA < ∆)) = rBC·P (τB < T, τA > ∆)+C·P (τB > T, τA > ∆)−C·P (τA < ∆)
and eventually:
Price =
rBC · P (τB < T, τA > ∆) + C · P (τB > T, τA > ∆)− C · P (τA < ∆)
1− (1 + rA) · P (τA < ∆) . (18)
A.2 Derivation of equation (17)
As stated in section 4, equation (17) is obtained as the sum of the three integrals in equations
(14) - (16) multiplied by the respective payoffs.
As for equation (14) one has:
P (τB < T, τA > ∆) =
∫ ∞
∆
dτA
∫ T
0
fA,B(τA, τB)dτB.
(19)
Making use of the well-known definition of the marginal and joint cumulative functions of
τA, τB, i.e. FA(τA), FB(τB) and FA,B(τA, τB), we can more easily compute the above expression
as:
P (τB < T, τA > ∆) = FB(T )− FAB (τB = T, τA = ∆)
=
(
1− e−λBT
)
−
(
e−[(λA∆)
θ+(λBT )
θ]
1
θ − e−λA∆ + 1− e−λBT
)
= −e−[(λA∆)θ+(λBT )θ]
1
θ + e−λA∆. (20)
Accordingly, equation (15) gives:
P (τB > T, τA > ∆) =
∫ ∞
∆
dτA
∫ ∞
T
fA,B(τA, τB)dτB
= 1− FA(∆)− FB(T ) + FAB(τB = T, τA = ∆)
= 1−
(
1− e−λA∆
)
−
(
1− e−λBT
)
+ e−[(λA∆)
θ+(λBT )
θ]
1
θ − e−λA∆ + 1− e−λBT
= e−[(λA∆)
θ+(λBT )
θ]
1
θ , (21)
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which nicely agrees with the result reported in equation (11).
Equation (16) is trivially:
P (τA < ∆) =
∫ ∞
0
dτB
∫ ∆
0
fA,B(τA, τB)dτA
= FA(∆)
= 1− e−λA∆ (22)
By summing up the contributions in equations (20) - (22) one immediately obtains the result in
equation (17).
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